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Abstract
A Richman game is a combinatorial game in which, rather than al-
ternating moves, the two players bid for the privilege of making the next
move. We find optimal strategies for both the case where a player knows
how much money his or her opponent has and the case where the player
does not.
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1
1 Introduction
There are two game theories. The first is now sometimes referred to as matrix
game theory and is the subject of the famous von Neumann and Morgenstern
treatise [7]. In matrix games, two players make simultaneous moves and a
payment is made from one player to the other depending on the chosen moves.
Optimal strategies often involve randomness and concealment of information.
The other game theory is the combinatorial theory ofWinning Ways [1], with
origins back in the work of Sprague [6] and Grundy [4], and largely expanded
upon by Conway [3]. In combinatorial games, two players move alternately.
We may assume that each move consists of sliding a token from one vertex to
another along an arc in a directed graph. A player who cannot move loses.
There is no hidden information and there exist deterministic optimal strategies.
In the late 1980s, David Richman suggested a class of games which share
some aspects of both sorts of game theory. Here is the set-up: The game is
played by two players (Mr. Blue and Ms. Red), each of whom has some money.
There is an underlying combinatorial game in which a token rests on a vertex
of some finite directed graph. There are two special vertices, denoted by b and
r; Blue’s goal is to bring the token to b and Red’s goal is to bring the token to
r. The two players repeatedly bid for the right to make the next move. One
way to execute this bidding process is for each player to write secretly on a
card a nonnegative real number no larger than the number of dollars he or she
has; the two cards are then revealed simultaneously. Whoever bids higher pays
the amount of the bid to the opponent and moves the token from the vertex
it currently occupies along an arc of the directed graph to a successor vertex.
Should the two bids be equal, the tie is broken by a toss of a coin. The game
ends when one player moves the token to one of the distinguished vertices. The
sole objective of each player is to have the game end with the token on his or
her vertex. (At the game’s end, money loses all value.) The game is a draw if
neither distinguished vertex is ever reached.
Note that with these rules (compare with [2]), there is never a reason for a
negative bid: since all successor vertices are available to both players, it cannot
be preferable to have the opponent move next. That is to say, there is no reason
to part with money for the chance that your opponent will carry out through
negligence a move that you yourself could perform through astuteness.
A winning strategy is a policy for bidding and moving that guarantees a
player the victory, given fixed initial data. (These initial data include where
the token is, how much money the player has, and possibly how much money
the player’s opponent has.) In section 2, we describe a winning strategy for
Richman games. In particular, we prove the following facts, which might seem
surprising:
• There exists a critical ratio R(v) such that Blue (respectively, Red) has a
winning strategy from a vertex v if Blue’s share of the money, expressed
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as a fraction of the total money supply, is greater than (resp., less than)
R(v). (This is not so surprising in the case of acyclic games, but for games
in general, one might have supposed it possible that, for a whole range of
initial conditions, play might go on forever.)
• There exists a strategy such that if a player has more than R(v) and applies
the strategy, the player will win with probability 1, without needing to
know how much money the opponent has.
In proving these assertions, it will emerge that an optimal bid for Blue is
R(v) − R(u) times the total money supply, where v is the current vertex and
u is the successor of v for which R(u) is as small as possible. A player who
cannot bid this amount “has already lost,” in the sense that there is no winning
strategy for that player. On the other hand, a player who has a winning strategy
of any kind and bids R(v) − R(u) will still have a winning strategy one move
later, regardless of who wins the bid, as long as he or she is careful to move to
u if he or she does win the bid.
It follows that we may think of R(v) − R(u) as the “fair price” that Blue
should be willing to pay for the privilege of trading the position v for the position
u. Thus we may define 1 − R(v) as the Richman value of the position v, so
that the fair price of a move exactly equals the difference in values of the two
positions. However, it is more convenient to work with R(v) than with 1−R(v),
so we have opted for this approach here. We call R(v) the Richman cost of the
position v.
We will see that for all v other than the distinguished vertices b and r, R(v)
is the average of R(u) and R(w), where u and w are the successors of v in the
digraph that minimize and maximize R(·), respectively. In the case where the
digraph underlying the game is acyclic, this averaging-property makes it easy
to compute the Richman costs of all the positions, beginning with the positions
b and r and working backwards. On the other hand, if the digraph contains
cycles it is not so easy to work out precise Richman costs.
We defer most of our examples to another paper [5] in which we also consider
infinite digraphs and discuss the complexity of the computation of Richman
costs.
2 The Richman Cost Function
Henceforth, D will denote a finite directed graph (V,E) with a distinguished
blue vertex b and a distinguished red vertex r such that from every vertex there
is a path to at least one of the distinguished vertices. For v ∈ V , let S(v) denote
the set of successors of v in D, that is S(v) = {w ∈ V : (v, w) ∈ E}. Given any
function f :V → [0, 1], we define
f+(v) = max
w∈S(v)
f(w) and f−(v) = min
u∈S(v)
f(u).
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The key to playing the Richman game on D is to attribute costs to the
vertices of D such that the cost of every vertex (except the two distinguished
vertices) is the average of the lowest and highest costs of its successors. Thus, a
function R:V → [0, 1] is called a Richman cost function if R(b) = 0, R(r) = 1,
and for every other v ∈ V we have R(v) = (R+(v) + R−(v))/2. (Note that
Richman costs are a curious sort of variant on harmonic functions on Markov
chains [8] where instead of averaging over all the successor-values, we average
only over the two extreme values.) The relations R+(v) ≥ R(v) ≥ R−(v) and
R+(v) +R−(v) = 2R(v) will be much used in what follows.
Theorem 1 The digraph D has a Richman cost function R(v).
Proof: We introduce an auxiliary function R(v, t) whose game-theoretic sig-
nificance will be made clearer in Theorem 2. Let R(b, t) = 0 and R(r, t) = 1
for all t ∈ N. For v /∈ {b, r}, define R(v, 0) = 1 and R(v, t) = (R+(v, t − 1) +
R−(v, t − 1))/2 for t > 0. It is easy to see that R(v, 1) ≤ R(v, 0) for all v,
and a simple induction shows that R(v, t + 1) ≤ R(v, t) for all v and all t ≥ 0.
Therefore R(v, t) is weakly decreasing and bounded below by zero as t → ∞,
hence convergent. It is also evident that the function v 7→ lim
t→∞
R(v, t) satisfies
the definition of a Richman cost function. ✷
Alternate proof: Identify functions f :V (D) → [0, 1] with points in the
|V (D)|-dimensional cube Q = [0, 1]|V (D)|. Given f ∈ Q, define g ∈ Q by
g(b) = 0, g(r) = 1, and, for every other v ∈ V , g(v) = (f+(v) + f−(v))/2. The
map f 7→ g is clearly a continuous map from Q into Q, and so by the Brouwer
fixed point theorem it has a fixed point. This fixed point is a Richman cost
function. ✷
This Richman cost function does indeed govern the winning strategy, as we
now prove.
Theorem 2 Suppose Blue and Red play the Richman game on the digraph D
with the token initially located at vertex v.
(1) If Blue’s share of the total money supply exceeds R(v) = lim
t→∞
R(v, t), then
he has a winning strategy.
(2) Moreover, his victory will require at most t moves if his share of the money
supply exceeds R(v, t).
Proof: Without loss of generality, money may be scaled so that the total supply
is one dollar. Whenever Blue has over R(v) dollars, he must have over R(v, t)
dollars for some t. We prove (2) by induction on t. At t = 0, Blue has over
R(v, 0) dollars only if v = b, in which case he has already won.
Now assume (2) is true for t−1, and let Blue have more than R(v, t) dollars.
There exist neighbors u and w of v such that R(u, t − 1) = R−(v, t − 1) and
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R(w, t−1) = R+(v, t−1), so that R(v, t) = (R(w, t−1)+R(u, t−1))/2. Blue can
bid (R(w, t−1)−R(u, t−1))/2 dollars. If Blue wins the bid at v, then he moves
to w and forces a win in at most t−1 moves (by the induction hypothesis), since
he has more than (R(w, t− 1)+R(u, t− 1))/2− (R(w, t− 1)−R(u, t− 1))/2 =
R(u, t− 1) dollars left. If Blue loses the bid, then Red will move to some z, but
Blue now has over (R(w, t− 1)+R(u, t− 1))/2+ (R(w, t− 1)−R(u, t− 1))/2 =
R(w, t− 1) ≥ R(z, t− 1) dollars, and again wins by the induction hypothesis. ✷
One can define another auxiliary function R′(v, t) where R′(b, t) = 0 and
R′(r, t) = 1 for all t ∈ N, and R′(v, 0) = 0 and R′(v, t) = (R+(v, t − 1) +
R−(v, t − 1))/2 for v /∈ {b, r}, t > 0. By an argument similar to the proof of
Theorem 2, this also converges to a Richman cost function R′(v) ≤ R(v) (with
R(v) defined as in the proof of Theorem 1). Thus, R′(v, t) indicates how much
money Blue needs to prevent Red from forcing a win from v in t or fewer moves,
so R′(v) indicates how much money Blue needs to prevent Red from forcing a
win in any length of time.
For certain infinite digraphs, it can be shown [5] that R′(v) is strictly less
than R(v). When Blue’s share of the money supply lies strictly between R′(v)
and R(v), both players can prevent the other player from winning. Thus, opti-
mal play leads to a draw.
Nevertheless, in this paper, we assume that D is finite, and we can conclude
that there is a unique Richman cost function R′(v) = R(v).
Theorem 3 The Richman cost function of the digraph D is unique.
The proof of Theorem 3 requires the following definition and technical lemma.
An edge (v, u) is said to be an edge of steepest descent if R(u) = R−(v). Let v
be the transitive closure of v under the steepest-descent relation. That is, w ∈ v
if there exists a path v = v0, v1, v2, ..., vk = w such that (vi, vi+1) is an edge of
steepest descent for i = 0, 1, ..., k − 1.
Lemma 4 Let R be any Richman cost function of the digraph D. If R(z) < 1,
then z contains b.
Proof of Lemma: Suppose R(z) < 1. Choose v ∈ z such that R(v) =
min
u∈z
R(u). Such a v must exist because D (and hence z) is finite. If v = b, we’re
done. Otherwise, assume v 6= b, and let u be any successor of v. The definition
of v implies R−(v) = R(v), which forces R+(v) = R(v). Since R(u) lies between
R−(v) and R+(v), R(u) = R(v) = R−(v). Hence (v, u) is an edge of steepest
descent, so u ∈ z. Moreover, u satisfies the same defining property that v did (it
minimized R(·) in the set z), so the same proof shows that for any successor w
of u, R(w) = R(u) and w ∈ z. Repeating this, we see that for any point w that
may be reached from v, R(w) = R(v) and w ∈ z. On the other hand, R(r) is
not equal to R(v) (since R(v) ≤ R(z) < 1 = R(r)), so r cannot be reached from
v. Therefore b can be reached from v, so we must have b ∈ z. ✷
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Proof of Theorem 3: Suppose that R1 and R2 are Richman cost functions
of D. Choose v such that R1 −R2 is maximized at v; such a v exists since D is
finite. Let M = R1(v) −R2(v). Choose u1, w1, u2, w2 (all successors of v) such
that R−
i
(v) = R(ui) and R
+
i
(v) = R(wi). Since R1(u1) ≤ R1(u2),
R1(u1)−R2(u2) ≤ R1(u2)−R2(u2) ≤M. (1)
(The latter inequality follows from the definition of M .) Similarly, R2(w2) ≥
R2(w1), so
R1(w1)−R2(w2) ≤ R1(w1)−R2(w1) ≤M (2)
Adding (1) and (2), we have
(R1(u1) +R1(w1))− (R2(u2) +R2(w2)) ≤ 2M.
The left side is 2R1(v)−2R2(v) = 2M so equality must hold in (1). In particular,
R1(u2) − R2(u2) = M ; i.e., u2 satisfies the hypothesis on v. Since u2 was any
vertex with R2(u2) = R
−
2 (v), induction shows that R1(u) − R2(u) = M for all
u ∈ v where descent is measured with respect to R2. Since R1(b) − R2(b) =
0 − 0 = 0 and b ∈ v, R1(v) − R2(v) ≤ 0 everywhere. That is, R1 ≤ R2. The
same argument for R2 −R1 shows the opposite inequality, so R1 = R2. ✷
The uniqueness of the Richman cost function implies in particular that the
function R′ defined after the proof of Theorem 2 coincides with the function R
constructed in the first proof of Theorem 1. From this we deduce the following:
Corollary 5 Suppose Blue and Red play the Richman game on the digraph D
with the token initially located at vertex v. If Blue’s share of the total money
supply is less than R(v) = lim
t→∞
R(v, t), then Red has a winning strategy. ✷
It is also possible to reverse the order of proof, and to derive Theorem 3 from
Corollary 5. For, if there were two Richman functions R1 and R2, with R1(v) <
R2(v), say, then by taking a situation in which Blue’s share of the money was
strictly between R1(v) and R2(v), we would find that both Blue and Red had
winning strategies, which is clearly absurd.
Theorem 2 and Corollary 5 do not cover the critical case where Blue has
exactly R(v) dollars. In the critical case, with both players using optimal strat-
egy, the outcome of the game depends on the outcomes of the coin-tosses used
to resolve tied bids. Note, however, that in all other cases, the deterministic
strategy outlined in the proof of Theorem 2 works even if the player with the
winning strategy concedes all ties and reveals his intended bid and intended
move before the bidding.
Summarizing Theorem 2 and Corollary 5, we may say that if Blue’s share
of the total money supply is less (respectively, greater) than R(v), then Red
(resp., Blue) has a winning strategy.
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3 Other Interpretations
Suppose the right to move the token is decided on each turn by the toss of a fair
coin. Then induction on t shows that the probability that Red can win from
the position v in at most t moves is equal to R(v, t), as defined in the previous
section. Taking t to infinity, we see that R(v) is equal to the probability that
Red can force a win against optimal play by Blue. That is to say, if both players
play optimally, R(v) is the chance that Red will win. The uniqueness of the
Richman cost function tells us that 1−R(v) must be the chance that Blue will
win. The probability of a draw is therefore zero.
If we further stipulate that the moves themselves must be random, in the
sense that the player whose turn it is to move must choose uniformly at ran-
dom from among the finitely many legal options, then we do not really have
a game-like situation anymore; rather, we are performing a random walk on a
directed graph with two absorbing vertices, and we are trying to determine the
respective probabilities of absorption at these two vertices. In this case, the
relevant probability function is just the harmonic function on the digraph D
(or, more properly speaking, the harmonic function for the associated Markov
chain [8]).
Another interpretation of the Richman cost, brought to our attention by
Noam Elkies, comes from a problem about makings bets. Suppose you wish
to bet (at even odds) that a certain baseball team will win the World Series,
but that your bookie only lets you make even-odds bets on the outcomes of
individual games. Here we assume that the winner of a World Series is the first
of two teams to win four games. To analyze this game, we create a directed
graph whose vertices correspond to the different possible combinations of cu-
mulative scores in a World Series, with two special terminal vertices (blue and
red) corresponding to victory for the two respective teams. Assume that your
initial amount of money is 1/2 a grand ($500), and that you want to end up
with either 0 grand or 1 grand, according to whether the blue team or the red
team wins the Series. Then it is easy to see that the Richman cost at a vertex
tells exactly how much money you want to have left if the corresponding state of
affairs transpires, and that the amount you should bet on any particular game
is the common value of R(v) − R(u) and R(w) − R(v), where v is the current
position, u is the successor position in which Blue wins the next game, and v is
the successor position in which Red wins the next game.
4 Incomplete Knowledge
Surprisingly, knowledge of one’s opponent’s money supply is unnecessary for the
construction of a winning strategy.
Define Blue’s safety ratio at v to be the fraction of the total money that he
has in his possession, divided by R(v) (the fraction that he needs in order to
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win). Note that Blue will not know the value of his safety ratio, since we are
assuming that he has no idea how much money Red has.
Theorem 6 Suppose Blue has a safety ratio strictly greater than 1. Then Blue
has a strategy that wins with probability 1 and does not require knowledge of
Red’s money supply. If, moreover, the digraph D is acyclic, then his strategy
wins regardless of tiebreaks; that is, “with probability 1” can be replaced by
“definitely”.
Proof: Here is Blue’s strategy: When the token is at vertex v, and he has
B dollars, he should act as if his safety ratio is 1; i.e., he should play as if Red
has Rcrit dollars with B/(B+Rcrit) = R(v) and the total amount of money is
B+Rcrit = B/R(v) dollars. He should accordingly bid
X =
R(v)−R−(v)
R(v)
B
dollars. Suppose Blue wins (by outbidding or by tiebreak) and moves to u along
an edge of steepest descent. Then Blue’s safety ratio changes
from
(
B
B+R
)
R(v)
to
(
B−X
B+R
)
R(u)
,
whereR is the actual amount of money that Red has. However, these two safety
ratios are actually equal, since
B−X
B
= 1−
X
B
= 1−
R(v)−R(u)
R(v)
=
R(u)
R(v)
.
Now suppose instead that Red wins the bid (by outbidding or by tiebreak) and
moves to z. Then Blue’s safety ratio changes
from
(
B
B+R
)
R(v)
to
(
B+Y
B+R
)
R(z)
,
with Y ≥ X. Note that the new safety ratio is greater than or equal to
(
B+X
B+R
)
R(w)
,
where R(w) = R+(v). But this lower bound on the new safety ratio is equal to
the old safety ratio, since
B+X
B
= 1 +
X
B
= 1 +
R(w) −R(v)
R(v)
=
R(w)
R(v)
.
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In either case, the safety ratio is non-decreasing. In particular, the safety
ratio must stay greater than 1. On the other hand, if Blue ever loses, then his
safety ratio at that moment would have to be at most 1, since his fraction of
the total money supply cannot be greater than R(r) = 1. Consequently, our
assumption that Blue’s safety ratio started out being greater than 1 implies that
Blue can never lose. In an acyclic digraph, infinite play is impossible, so the
game must terminate at b with a victory for Blue.
In the case where cycles are possible, suppose first that at some stage Red
outbids Blue by ǫB > 0 and gets to make the next move, say from v to w. If
Blue was in a favorable situation at v, then the total amount of money that
the two players have between them must be less than 1
R(v)B. On the other
hand, after the payoff by Red, Blue has B+X+ ǫB = (1 + R(v)−R(u)
R(v) + ǫ)B =
(2R(v)−R(u)
R(v) + ǫ)B = (
R(w)
R(v) + ǫ)B, so that Blue’s total share of the money must
be more than R(w) + ǫR(v). Blue can do this calculation as well as we can; he
then knows that if he had been in a winning position to begin with, his current
share of the total money must exceed R(w) + ǫR(v). Now, R(w) + ǫR(v) is
greater than R(w, t) for some t, so Blue can win in t moves. Thus, Red loses to
Blue’s strategy if she ever bids more than he does. Hence, if she hopes to avoid
losing, she must rely entirely on tiebreaking. Since Blue cannot lose, there is a
shortest path of steepest descent to b from every vertex that will be reached as
play continues. Let the longest of these paths have length N . Then Blue will
win the game when he wins N consecutive tiebreaks (if not earlier). ✷
When D has cycles, Blue may need to rely on tiebreaks in order to win, as
in the case of the Richman game played on the digraph pictured in Figure 1.
Suppose that the token is at vertex marked v, that Blue has B dollars, and that
Figure 1: The digraph D and its Richman costs
❤❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
✲ ✟
✟✟
✟✟✯
❍❍❍❍❍❥
❍❍❍❍❍❥
✟✟✟✟✟✙
✻
b
r
v
1/21/2
0
1
1/2
1/2
Red has R dollars. Clearly, Blue knows he can win the game if B > R. But
without knowing R, it would be imprudent for him to bid any positive amount
ǫB for fear that Red actually started with (1− ǫ)B dollars; for if that were the
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case, and his bid were to prevail, the token would move to a vertex where the
Richman cost is 1/2 and Blue would have less money than Red. Such a situation
will lead to a win for Red if she follows the strategy outlined in Theorem 2.
5 Rationality
For every vertex v of the digraph D (other than b, r), let v+ and v− denote
successors of v for which R(v+) = R+(v) and R(v−) = R−(v). Then we have
R(b) = 0, R(r) = 1, and 2R(v) = R(v+) +R(v−) for v 6= b, r. We can view this
as a linear program. By Theorem 3, this system must have a unique solution.
Since all coefficients are rational, we see that Richman costs are always rational
numbers.
The linear programming approach also gives us a conceptually simple (though
computationally dreadful) way to calculate Richman costs. If we augment
our program by adding additional conditions of the form R(v−) ≤ R(w) and
R(v+) ≥ R(w) where v ranges over the vertices of D other than b and r and
where, for each v, w ranges over all the successors of v, then we are effectively
adding in the constraint that the edges from v to v− and v+ are indeed edges
of steepest descent and ascent, respectively. The uniqueness of Richman costs
tells us that if we let the mappings v 7→ v− and v 7→ v+ range over all possi-
bilities (subject to the constraint that both v− and v+ must be successors of
v), the resulting linear programs (which typically will have no solutions at all)
will have only solutions that correspond to the genuine Richman cost functions.
Hence, in theory one could try all the finitely many possibilities for v 7→ v− and
v 7→ v+ and solve the associated linear programs until one found one with a
solution. However, the amount of time such an approach would take increases
exponentially with the size of the directed graph. In [5], we discuss more efficient
approaches.
We will also discuss in [5], among other things, a variant of Richman games,
which we call “Poorman” games, in which the winning bid is paid to a third party
(auctioneer or bank) rather than to one’s opponent. The whole theory carries
through largely unchanged, except that Poorman costs are typically irrational.
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